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Abstract—Gate camouflaging is a technique for obfuscating the
function of a circuit against reverse engineering attacks. However,
if an adversary has pre-existing knowledge about the set of
functions that are viable for an application, random camouflaging
of gates will not obfuscate the function well. In this case, the
adversary can target their search, and only needs to decide
whether each of the viable functions could be implemented by
the circuit.
In this work, we propose a method for using camouflaged cells
to obfuscate a design that has a known set of viable functions. The
circuit produced by this method ensures that an adversary will
not be able to rule out any viable functions unless she is able to
uncover the gate functions of the camouflaged cells. Our method
comprises iterated synthesis within an overall optimization loop
to combine the viable functions, followed by technology mapping
to deploy camouflaged cells while maintaining the plausibility of
all viable functions. We evaluate our technique on cryptographic
S-box functions and show that, relative to a baseline approach,
it achieves up to 38% area reduction in PRESENT-style S-Boxes
and 48% in DES S-boxes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The are many reasons that a chip designer may wish to
prevent a reverse engineer from learning the exact function
implemented on a target chip. He may, for example, want
to prevent IP theft or prevent an adversary from learning
information about the architecture which would allow her to
mount side channel attacks.
Partially prompted by the increasing practicality of invasive
reverse engineering attacks, there has been recently several
proposals for using look-alike cells to obfuscate circuit func-
tions, sometimes coined gate camouflage. For example, works
have proposed to do this using oxide-terminated vias [6], [13],
using different threshold voltages [8], [7], or using doping to
create stuck-at-faults [4]. In the scenario where intermediate
values can be read through a scan chain, SAT-based attacks
are applicable [11], [12].
Given that an adversary won’t know the exact function of
each look-alike cell, she must consider an exponential set of
plausible functions that the circuit may implement. We use
the terminology plausible function of a circuit to denote a
function that a circuit or sub-circuit could implement given its
use of camouflaged cells. Starting with a synthesized circuit, a
designer replaces ordinary cells with camouflaged look-alike
cells, and in doing so implicitly creates the exponential set
of plausible functions that is guaranteed to contain the true
function as well as many other (incorrect) functions. Yet, even
a set with exponentially many plausible functions may not
fool an attacker who knows that only specific functions are
viable for the chip’s application. For instance, for an obfuscated
arithmetic function, it is usually easy for an attacker to extract
the correct functionality. An attacker can check whether the
plausible functions contain a particular function of interest (e.g.
a viable function) by checking satisfiability of a QBF problem
that is similar to equivalence checking, but with unconstrained
side inputs that select which of the plausible functions is
realized by the circuit [14]. Previous works have not addressed
how to obfuscate against such an adversary with knowledge of
viable functions, and have implicitly assumed that the attacker
sees all plausible circuit functions as viable ones.
In this work, we consider how to obfuscate a circuit against
an adversary that has prior knowledge of a fixed set of viable
functions that might be implemented in an obfuscated design.
In the setting that we consider, an adversary is not able to
query inner circuit values directly, and is seeking to reverse
engineer the logic function of a circuit using the following
capabilities:
• She has knowledge of the cell library used in the design,
including camouflaged look-alike cells.
• She can identify the cells and their connections by imaging
the delayered circuit and matching against the components
from the library. Her knowledge of the library allows her
to infer the plausible functions of each look-alike cell
instance, but she does not specifically know which of the
functions is implemented by each cell instance.
• She has pre-existing knowledge of a specific set of viable
logic functions F = (f1, . . . , fn) for the circuit.
The number of different n-input Boolean functions is doubly
exponential in the number of inputs, whereas the number of
plausible functions in a camouflaged combinational circuit
is, at most, exponential in the number of camouflaged cells.
Therefore, it is improbable that the viable functions will
be found in the set of plausible functions unless they are
intentionally made to be plausible. This implies that random
camouflaging is insufficient for obfuscating viable functions.
In this paper we go beyond random camouflaging to present
an automation strategy that the designer can use to achieve his
goal of making plausible all of the viable functions.
The specific contributions made in this paper are as follows.
• A description of the obfuscation problem in which the
adversary has partial knowledge about circuit function but
lacks ability to query the direct outputs of the circuit.
• A novel design automation strategy using synthesis, heuris-
tic optimization, and technology mapping to obfuscate
circuits in a way that makes a set of chosen functions all
appear plausible.
• Evaluation of the approach on cryptographic S-box cir-
cuits, showing an area reduction of up to 48% in DES S-
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Fig. 1: The library cell for a 2-input NAND gate
boxes and up to 38% in PRESENT S-boxes [5] compared
to an approach that does not employ our method.
II. SETTING
Although our technique is compatible with any library
of camouflaged cells, we use cells that are constructed by
modifying the doping of nominal library cells. By modifying
doping to turn transistors ON and OFF, a cell can be made to
implement the positive and negative co-factors of its nominal
function with respect to each input.
For example, consider the camouflaged 2-input NAND as
shown in Fig. 1a. The nominal function of the cell is f = AB.
In a variant where p2 is always ON and n2 is always OFF,
the cell implements fB , which is constant ’1’. On the other
hand, if p2 is always OFF and n2 is always ON, then the
cell is implementing fB which is A. The cell can be similarly
modified to implement fA = 1, fA = B, and fAB = 0.
Fig. 1b shows the truth table of all possible functions that can
be achieved by changing the transistor doping of a 2-input
NAND gate. We use the same approach to create camouflaged
versions of the other library cells as well.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We propose a three-phase approach for synthesizing circuits
that can plausibly implement a chosen set of functions. We
use logic synthesis to create a merged logic circuit with the
capability to implement all the functions. We then add heuristic
optimization to decide how to impose the functions onto each
other in a way that maximizes logic sharing in synthesis. Lastly
we perform technology mapping to cover the synthesized circuit
using the plausible functions of the camouflaged look-alike
cells, to reduce cost while preserving security.
A. Phase I: Multi-Function Synthesis
To have a general circuit that can implement viable functions
(f0, f1, . . . , fn−1), we write RTL for a design that contains all
of the functions with shared input signals, and add multiplexers
at the outputs to choose between the outputs of the different
functions. Fig. 2 shows the high level schematic of this merged
circuit for n functions, each with 4 inputs and 4 outputs. The
select inputs to the multiplexers choose which function’s output
will be the overall output of the circuit, and therefore, for
appropriate assignment to the select inputs, the merged circuit
is equivalent to any of the viable functions.
The merged design containing all viable functions is then
synthesized to produce a gate-level design where the select
signals are inputs that may be used anywhere in the circuit, and
not only right at the outputs. We use ABC [1] for synthesis
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Fig. 2: High level schematic for the circuit merging n different
4-input 4-output functions, such as 4-bit S-boxes
to enhance logic sharing and minimize area with our own
script comprising multiple refactor, rewrite and balance
commands. Because ABC has limited input syntax, we use
Yosys [3] to map RTL into a blif netlist that can be read by
ABC. ABC maps the blif to a set of logic gates comprising
inverters, buffers, and 2-4 input NAND, NOR, AND, OR gates.
B. Phase II: Maximizing Logic Sharing
Circuit synthesis of a merged design will inherently try to
share logic across the viable functions in order to minimize
area. However, the potential for logic sharing depends on the
input and output pin assignments of the merged functions.
Assuming that an adversary doesn’t know which specific
signals are carried on particular input or output wires, she
must consider a function to be plausible as long as there is
some input and output interpretation that causes the obfuscated
block to plausibly implement that function. The designer can
exploit this degree of freedom to choose the input and output
correspondence across the viable functions in a way that will
maximize logic sharing.
Fig. 3 shows two different ways of mapping the functions
f0 = (AB+CD)E and f1 = (FG+HI)+J onto each other.
A designer that wants to show both functions as plausible must
decide which input of f0 corresponds to each input of function
f1. The mapping in Fig. 3a is preferable because it allows
the sub-circuit surrounded by a dotted line to be used in both
functions f0 and f1. However, in Fig. 3b, the input placement
does not allow the same extent of sub-circuit sharing between
functions f0 and f1, and more gates are needed to implement
the function. This example shows that assigning input position
of each function can increase opportunities for logic sharing
between functions and can hence reduce redundant logic to
save area. The same observation about effective pin assignment
also holds true for outputs when the respective functions have
multiple outputs.
When the number of viable functions is large, it is infea-
sible to find the best pin assignment by exhaustive search.
Furthermore, random search may not yield a good solution.
To address this issue, we find effective pin assignments using
genetic algorithm with the Python Package DEAP [2]. The
fitness function used to evaluate the quality of a pin assignment
is the synthesized circuit area as reported by ABC. Therefore,
we are using repeated logic synthesis in our exploration of pin
assignments to try to find a pin assignment that will minimize
area by enabling a high degree of logic sharing across the
functions.
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Fig. 3: An example showing the importance of input positioning
for logic sharing
The genotype of genetic algorithm is a vector that specifies
the pin assignments of the viable functions. For inputs, the
genotype specifies which input pin of each viable function
will share the same input pin of the overall merged circuit.
For outputs, the genotype specifies which output pins of
each viable function will connect to the function-selecting
multiplexer of each output in the merged circuit. The fitness of
genotypes are evaluated using the area reported by synthesis
as explained above. Area is a useful objective because it
encourages configurations that maximize sharing.Genotype
instances with high fitness (low area) are propagated using
mutation and crossover.
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Fig. 4: Synthesized circuit area of 8 merged PRESENT S-boxes
when pin assignment is random or chosen by genetic algorithm.
Figures 4a and 4b together show that the genetic algorithm
is able to find solutions that use less area than what can be
achieved by trying random configurations. Fig. 4b shows how
the area improves across iterations of genetic algorithm. The
reported areas are in units of GE (gate equivalents) which is the
circuit area normalized to the area of a NAND2 gate in the same
technology. The x-axis shows the number of generations in
genetic algorithm, with each generation creating and evaluating
a number of individuals. For comparison, we also evaluate a
number (9726) of random pin assignments that is equal to the
number of individuals evaluated during the genetic algorithm
process; the distribution of areas from the random individuals
is shown in Fig. 4a. The area of the average and best random
solutions are drawn as horizontal lines on Fig. 4b to show
visually that the genetic algorithm method is clearly finding
pin assignment solutions that surpass what can be achieved by
generating the same number of configurations randomly.
C. Phase III: Technology Mapping to Deploy Cells
The synthesized merged circuit has a number of logical
“select” inputs that choose between the viable functions. This
circuit gets mapped to a circuit with camouflaged gates such
that all viable functions in the synthesized circuit become
plausible functions in the mapped circuit. One could accomplish
this by adding a stealthy mechanism to connect each select
signal to supply or ground; the attacker, without knowing the
values of the select signals, would not be able to rule out
any viable functions. However, instead of assigning values to
the select signals, we use technology mapping to reduce the
area cost of the circuit and eliminate the select signals. As
will be explained, the key to this mapping is ensuring that,
locally for any subcircuit with camouflaged cells, the plausible
functions of the subcircuit include all corresponding functions
of the synthesized circuit for any assignment to its select inputs.
Meeting this condition ensures that all viable functions that
were plausible in the synthesized circuit will remain plausible
in the mapped circuit.
As is common in technology mapping [9], our approach
decomposes the circuit graph into trees and uses dynamic
programming tree covering to map the trees into cells. Each
tree describes a fanout-free subcircuit with a single output
that implements some Boolean function over the leaf nodes
of the tree. The significant difference between our approach
and ordinary technology mapping by tree covering is that in
ordinary technology mapping, a subtree can be mapped to a cell
if the cell’s single function is equivalent to the subtree’s single
function. In our approach, since we have to consider multiple
functions depending on the value of the select signals, a subtree
can be mapped to a cell if the cell’s plausible functions contain
all of the desired functions for the subtree.
To allow tree covering to be used on the synthesized circuit,
we first create a forest of trees from the circuit by splitting it at
all fanouts. We then use the tree-covering procedure described
in Alg. 1 for mapping each tree to camouflaged cells. The
algorithm uses dynamic programming starting from the leaf
nodes of the tree and working toward the output. Whenever
a node is considered for mapping, minimum-cost mappings
will have already been discovered for all nodes in its transitive
fanin. The function ABSFUNC in line 6 abstracts away any
select signals in the tree; in doing so the logic function of
the tree is translated into the set of logic functions that it can
implement for any assignment to the select signals in the tree.
To cover a node, different-sized subtrees having that node as
output are candidates to be mapped to a new camouflaged cell.
Each candidate subtree will have different leaf nodes from the
other candidate subtrees. If a subtree is mapped to a cell, the
cost of that covering is the cost of that cell added to the cost
of of the optimal coverings of all of its leaf nodes (line 10 of
Alg. 1). The lowest cost covering is chosen for each node in
the tree until the entire tree is covered.
Algorithm 1 Technology mapping to cover a tree with camouflage cells
to eliminate the select inputs while preserving as plausible all functions of the
output node that could occur under any assignment of the select inputs.
1: function TREE-COVER(t)
2: cost(ni)←∞ ∀ nodes ni ∈ t
3: for each node ni ∈ t, in topological order do
4: for each subtree ts with output ni and depth < 3 do
5: . leaves of ts are already-covered nodes in t
6: F (ts)←ABSFUNC(ts) . functions to preserve
7: for each camouflage library cell gj do
8: if plausiblefunctions(gj ) ⊇ F (ts) then
9: . cell gj contains all functions of ts
10: c← cost(gj) +
∑
nk∈Leaves(ts) cost(nk)
11: if c < cost(ni) then
12: cost(ni)← c . new opt. cover for ni
13: . Cover ni by mapping ts to cell gj and using optimal covers
for leaf nodes of ts
14: end if
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: end for
19: return mapped circuit for tree
20: end function
IV. EVALUATION
To evaluate our proposed method, we use the 16 different
4-bit S-box functions from Leander and Poschmann [10] as
viable functions. Each such S-box is a 4-bit-input 4-bit-output
function that requires around 30 gate equivalents to implement.
We create obfuscated designs that plausibly implement 2, 4, 8 or
all 16 of the S-box functions in a single circuit. Additionally,
we create obfuscated designs that plausibly implement 2,4,
or all 8 of the 6-bit-input 4-bit-output DES S-boxes (each
of these S-boxes are around 150 gate equivalents in area).
We use genetic algorithm as discussed in III-B and generate
random pin position assignments equal to the number of total
individuals that are evaluated in genetic algorithm. We then
use the technology mapping algorithm from III-C to map
the resulting circuits into our camouflaged library cells. To
validate the correctness of our implementation, we verify using
ModelSim that the resulting circuits can implement each of the
viable functions when appropriate gate functions are supplied.
Tab. I reports the synthesized area for the best case and average
case of random pin assignment, as well as the area when genetic
algorithm is used (GA), and the area when genetic algorithm
is followed by technology mapping (GA+TM); all areas are
given in units of GE (gate equivalents).
As can be seen, when comparing our final area to the synthe-
sized result for the best randomly discovered pin assignment,
our techniques provide an area improvement of up to 38% for
the PRESENT S-box and up to 48% for the merged DES S-box
circuit. The area savings from our approach generally increases
with the size of the circuit. The modest incremental cost of
going from 8 to 16 PRESENT S-boxes is due to the limited
size of the circuit. Note that our savings are conservative, as the
area cost of the randomly generated solutions do not include
the additional costs that would be needed to stealthily connect
the select inputs to supply or ground.
TABLE I: Area comparison for merged S-box circuits
Random GA GA+TM Improvement(%)
Circuit #S-boxes avg best
PRESENT
2 54 42 41 39 7
4 108 84 74 65 23
8 205 164 118 101 38
16 248 213 183 141 34
DES
2 257 217 200 195 10
4 496 447 257 242 46
8 923 805 473 416 48
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed an automation technique
for designing circuits that can plausibly implement a number
of chosen functions. Our procedure comprises synthesis and
optimization of pin assignments to maximize shared logic
between the functions, and a technology mapping step that
deploys camouflaged cells while ensuring that all desired
functions are plausible in the final circuit. For the problem of
S-box design, our technique saves up to 38% area in PRESENT
S-boxes and 48% in DES S-boxes. This approach can find
wide application in a number of practical scenarios where the
adversary has partial information about what functions would
be viable in an obfuscated design.
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